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ORGANIZATION, SELECTION AND TRAINING OF 
NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAMS — 
A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 
by 
David Charters 
In the aftermath of the skilful and dramatic hostage rescue operation at the 
Iranian embassy in London in May 1980, questions were raised concerning 
Canada's ability to respond in similar situations. It was pointed out that 
Canada does not at present possess any force equivalent to the Special Air 
Service (SAS) Regiment, the British unit that effected the London rescue. 
Government spokesmen expressed confidence that the general military training 
of the armed forces would provide "the capability to cope with most contingen-
cies".' This writer is concerned that Canada should be able to cope with all 
contingencies, and is on record in urging our government to consider the 
creation of a National Response Team to deal with incidents of politically-
motivated violence which exceed the response capabilities of ordinary police 
forces.2 In an earlier article in this journal3 it was noted that rescue operations on 
the London model were the products of constant individual and unit training to 
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a high standard — a standard that cannot be met from hastily-assembled volun-
teers or part-time service and training. This article will outline the organization, 
selection and training of the SAS and its West German counterpart, with a view 
to suggesting an appropriate model for a Canadian National Response Team. 
The SAS 
The Iranian embassy siege was broken by a Counter-Revolutionary Warfare 
(CRW) team from 22 SAS, a regular regiment of the British Army. First raised 
to carry out operations behind enemy lines during the Second World War, the 
regiment was disbanded at the end of the war, then raised again in Malaya 
where it was employed in deep patrol action during the Emergency. 22 SAS was 
subsequently active in many theatres, sometimes operating at squadron 
strength, sometimes as individuals or small teams sent to train special forces and 
presidential bodyguards in third world countries.4 Individual members of the 
regiment served in intelligence staff positions in Northern Ireland from 1972, 
and since 1976 several squadrons have been deployed in the province, carrying 
out covert operations against the Provisional Irish Republican Army.5 Action in 
the most dangerous areas, such as South Armagh, has kept the SAS up-to-date 
on anti-terrorist techniques and the CRW teams of 22 SAS provide Britain's 
domestic anti-terrorist capability. 
The regiment has a small headquarters in London, commanded by a briga-
dier, from which liaison with the Ministry of Defence and other government 
departments (in particular, the Home Office) is carried out and the regiment 
administered. 22 SAS is based in Hereford, near the Welsh border, and this base 
contains the operational headquarters of the regular component, the selection 
and training branch, a research and development group and 22 SAS itself. 22 
SAS is organized with a headquarters, signals squadron and four sabre 
squadrons. Each sabre squadron consists of about 80 men divided into four 
troops. The total establishment of 22 SAS is probably no more than 750 men.6 
The CRW wing was created as part of the training branch in the late 1960's 
and after 1972 was given responsibility for all aspects of training with respect to 
hostage rescue, including collection of information about terrorist techniques. 
The CRW task is assigned to each squadron on rotation, between duty in 
Northern Ireland and missions abroad. While assigned to the mission, the 
CRW squadron undergoes a refresher course and carries out a siege-breaking 
exercise monthly, followed by a prolonged debrief. In order to ensure continuity 
of readiness and expertise, the departing squadron remains on standby for a 
limited period to assist the successor squadron as it takes on the CRW task.7 
High performance is ensured by rigorous selection and training standards. 
The regiment has only a small permanent command and training cadre; all the 
rest are volunteers from regular regiments of the British Army. Most who are 
selected are in their late twenties with several years of soldiering behind them. 
The SAS looks for a soldier who is assertive, self-disciplined, above average in 
intelligence, able to work unsupervised and for long periods in isolation, and 
who has stamina, patience and a sense of humour. Consequently, the selection 
process emphasizes spiritual or mental toughness as much as physical fitness. 
The six month selection course includes fitness training, basic fieldcraft and 
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weapons skills, an army parachuting course and three weeks of combat survival 
training. During this latter phase, which is designed to stretch men 
psychologically and physically, the volunteers are taught bush survival, escape 
and evasion, and are subjected to various interrogation techniques. The final 
rejection of doubtful candidates occurs at the end of this exercise, and all those 
who make the grade are "badged", that is, they become members of the SAS. 
Training goes on within the unit. Specialist courses in signals, languages, 
medical techniques, explosives, pistol snooting and winter warfare will continue 
for nearly another eighteen months. During this time the new soldier is assigned 
to one of the troops of a sabre squadron specializing either in small boat opera-
tions, mountain climbing, free fall parachuting or long-distance overland 
navigation in land rovers. Even after this the new member would probably see 
active service, in Northern Ireland or elsewhere, before assignment to a CRW 
team. After a three year tour with the SAS, officers tend to go back to their 
regiments, while a number of enlisted men "re-up" for continued service.8 
The high standards and valuable practical experience of the SAS made it an 
obvious model for other security forces, notably the West German 
Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG9). The principal difference between the two forces is 
that the SAS is a regular army unit while GSG9 is a para-military police force. 
The GSG9 
Law enforcement in West Germany is almost exclusively a provincial 
responsibility. Each province has its own Ministry of the Interior and several 
police forces. The primary responsibility for dealing with crisis situations has 
fallen on the emergency police forces based in these provinces. The federal role 
in law enforcement is carried out by three agencies: the federal criminal inves-
tigation department and the Office for Protection of the Constitution, which are 
mainly concerned with intelligence collection and analysis, and the Federal 
Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz). Because the West German constitution 
does not permit the armed forces to undertake internal security duties, the 
constitution was amended in 1972 to allow the Border Guard to fulfill this role 
when so requested by the provincial ministries.9 
Following the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972, the Border 
Guard formed a special unit, known as Group 9, for the purpose of combatting 
terrorism.10 The force consists of 177 senior police officers, organized as 
follows:" 
1. Command Element — a small headquarters under the direction of a 
colonel, plus an intelligence section which collects information from 
federal agencies. If necessary, the headquarters is mobile. 
2. Four operational units, each consisting of 30 men, sub-divided into a 
command section and five special service sections. 
3. Communications and documentation unit. 
4. Three technical groups, and supply and maintenance services. 
GSG9 draws its recruits from the provincial police forces, the Border Guard 
and the armed forces, on a volunteer basis, for up to five years. A two day selec-
tion period eliminates about half the potential recruits. They receive seven and 
half months of training in two phases; three months of basic physical and 
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psychological training, and four and a half months of training in specialist skills. 
The latter include close quarter combat, tactical teamwork, weapons, com-
munications, explosives and disposal, scuba diving and airborne operations. 
Recruits also take courses in law and police procedures, medical techniques, 
evasive driving, theories of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and airport and 
aircraft familiarization. Training exercises emphasize the psychological aspect 
and joint exercises are carried out with the security forces from the provinces.12 
The GSG9 has been used only once on its own (the hijack-hostage rescue at 
Mogadishu), but has been called in to assist local forces in some routine law 
enforcement operations. Such actions help maintain morale and conditioning, 
and give practical experience to the unit. 
Canadian Considerations 
It is possible that Canada may be spared the kind of political violence which 
has plagued Britain and West Germany, although current international trends 
give little cause for optimistic assessments. Prudence suggests that our ability to 
react effectively should not be left to chance: a National Response Team is a 
necessary investment. If this is agreed, the next decision would concern 
composition. Should the team be provided by the Canadian Armed Forces or 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)? As a federal force the RCMP 
is in a position analogous to that of the West German Border Guard, but unlike 
the German force it also provides the provincial police for eight of Canada's ten 
provinces. The RCMP has already developed Emergency Response Teams to 
deal with gun calls, barricaded persons and hostage incidents of a criminal 
nature and these teams are stationed in various regions of the country.13 On the 
face of it, a good case could be made to create a National Response Team from 
RCMP resources. There are, however, practical considerations which mitigate 
against this course of action. The high standards of performance demonstrated 
by the SAS and the GSG9 obtained from constant training and practical 
experience related directly to the hostage rescue/siege-breaking task. In terms 
of both manpower and finance, could the RCMP afford to detach several 
hundred policemen for long periods to prepare for a task which bears no relation 
to normal police work? Such long separations might be harmful to the individual 
policeman's career, but short-term attachments or intermittent training would 
not produce a unit of the desired high standard. Furthermore, jurisdictional 
disputes could arise from deployment of an RCMP-based National Response 
Team. Provinces and municipalities guard jealously their prerogatives in law 
enforcement, even where the RCMP itself provides the force of local or provin-
cial jurisdiction. Difficulties could arise easily over command and control of the 
unit while on operations in a particular province and financial responsibility for 
its upkeep and operations. Furthermore, any major terrorist incident could 
quickly involve federal departments,14 and thus lead to a clash of jurisdiction, 
command and responsibility. Finally, the assignment of policemen to an essen-
tially para-military task would raise questions about the sort of public image the 
RCMP would wish to project. The Canadian public may be accustomed to the 
fact that our policemen carry and use firearms, but one is forced to wonder if 
they would be prepared to accept an even more violent role for the men in 
scarlet. 
% 
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The creation of a specialist unit within the armed forces would, on the other 
hand, enhance existing capabilities for general war operations by providing a 
compatible peace-time role and a sense of mission. The more soldiers cycled 
through the special force the greater would be the benefit to the armed forces as 
a whole. The siege-breaking anti-terrorist role is, after all, essentially a military 
one. Many of the skills, techniques and expertise required for such operations 
already reside in the armed forces, however dispersed at present through 
different arms and services. Appropriate base and training facilities exist in 
various parts of the country and military air transport, both tactical and 
strategic, is readily available to move men, vehicles and equipment. Moreover, 
the jurisdictional problems associated with deploying the RCMP in such a role 
should not accrue to use of the armed forces since, under the National Defence 
Act,the armed forces may be used "in aid of the civil power" in any province 
simply at the request of that government. Channels of authority and respon-
sibility are already defined.15 
Whatever shape such a force might take, the organization, selection and train-
ing would be a lengthy process. It should not be attempted lightly or in haste. At 
the same time, we may hope that Canada will not have to suffer a Munich-type 
disaster before the Government decides to act. 
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